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ABSTRACT 
In today’s safety-critical systems such as process and manufacturing plants, operators are 
often moved to a control room far away from the physical environment, and increasing 
amounts of information are passed to them via automated systems, they therefore need a 
greater level of support to control and maintain the facilities in a safe condition. This is 
especially important when operators confront abnormal situations in which the information 
flow is quite high and poor decisions may lead to serious consequences. Therefore, they 
need to be supported from a cognitive perspective to reduce their workload, stress, and 
consequent error rate. Of the various cognitive activities, a correct understanding of the 
situation, that is situation awareness (SA), has been found to be a crucial factor in improving 
performance and reducing error. However, existing system safety researches focus mainly 
on technical issues and often neglect SA. 
This research reviews the role of SA in accidents of safety-critical environments and 
introduces a clear definition for abnormal situations based on risk indicators. It then relies 
on mental models that embody stored long-term knowledge about the systems, and 
develops an abnormal situations modelling (ASM) method, that exploits the specific 
capabilities of Bayesian networks (BNs). In this sense, it is assumed that the operator’s 
mental model can be modelled using BNs as a representation of static cause–effect 
relationships between objects in the situation. Following this, the research presents an 
innovative cognition-driven decision support system called the situation awareness support 
system (SASS) to manage abnormal situations in safety-critical environments in which the 
effect of situational complexity on human decision-makers is a concern. The SASS consists 
of five major components: (1) a knowledge–base that contains the abnormal situation 
models of the intended environment developed by the ASM method, (2) a situation data 
collection component that provides the current state of the observable variables based on 
online conditions and monitoring systems, (3) a situation assessment component that uses 
risk indicators and a fuzzy logic system to generate the assessment result, (4) a situation 
V 
recovery component that provides a basis for decision-making to reduce the risk level of 
situations to an acceptable level, and (5) a human-computer interface. The performance of 
the SASS is demonstrated by three cases investigated by the US Chemical Safety Board in 
which poor operators’ SA has created industrial disasters in recent US history. The results of 
performance demonstrate that the SASS provides a useful graphical, mathematically 
consistent system for dealing with incomplete and uncertain information to help operators 
maintain the risk of dynamic situations at an acceptable level.  
The SASS is partially evaluated by a sensitivity analysis, which is carried out to validate 
the BN-based situation models, and a multi-perspective evaluation approach is proposed 
based on SA measures to determine the degree to which the SASS improves not degrades 
the operator’s SA. The approach consists of three SA metrics: the Situation Awareness 
Global Assessment Technique, the Situation Awareness Rating Technique, and the NASA 
Task Load Index. The first two metrics are used for direct objective and subjective 
measurement of SA, while the third is used to estimate the workload of operators. The 
approach is applied in a safety-critical environment, and ten operators participate in two 
40-minute simulation trials using a virtual plant user interface, both with and without the 
support of the SASS. The results indicate that the SASS improves operators’ SA, and 
specifically has benefits for SA levels 2 and 3. No significant correlations between the 
participants’ SA scores have been found. In addition, it is concluded that the SASS reduces 
the workload of operators, although further investigations in different environments with a 
larger number of participants have been suggested. 
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